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ABSTRACT: The paper unfolds a preliminary theory of so-called objective 
or ontological historicity, that is to say, a theory of historicity which is not 
founded in the human subject. The article does this by deriving a notion 
of historicity from classical ontology by drawing upon figures such as 
Aristotle, Cusanus, Leibniz and Kant. One of the leading examples 
analysed throughout the paper is the museal object, which seems to 
embody a certain aporia between an immediate presence and the 
presence of a bygone era and time. It is argued that the historical objects 
qua historical objects exhibit a certain monadic quality, but that the 





Throughout the history of philosophy, the discussion of the question of 
historicity has relied upon a paradigm, which sharply distinguishes between 
human and natural history as two distinct domains.2 In virtue of its freedom 
and reason, only humankind, so the argument goes, can be said to possess an 
“open” or indeterminate relationship to its history, and this ability to freely 
engage with its own history, i.e. a certain agency, is necessary for something to 
constitute a historical being. The happening of events only in part constitutes 
history; it is through the narratives, with which we engage with these events, 
that genuine development occurs. For this reason, nature cannot properly be 
characterized as historical since it does not develop but rather “occurs” in 
accordance with the law of causality. Therefore, history is limited to a distinctly 
 
1 I wish to thank Søren Harnow Klausen, Jørgen Hass, Jesper Lundsfryd Rasmussen, Thomas 
Schwarz Wentzer, and Jon Rostgaard Boiesen for their very helpful and constructive comments, 
suggestions and critiques. I am also indebted to the reviewer for pushing me on several 
important points and making me aware that the original draft of the paper ended on a more 
conciliatory note than the analysis warranted. 
2 Cf. Rossi (1987). 
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human mode of being and the manufactured artefacts stemming from this.3 
This is, in short, the pattern of thought that philosophy of historicity in modern 
time has ascribed to, though the thought of a universal history has waned in 
favour of a greater focus on the historicity of human existence as is the case in 
the hermeneutical and phenomenological traditions. 
However, the history of philosophy harbours another tradition that, in an 
indirect fashion, has grappled with the question of historicity. It has its roots in 
the philosophy of Aristotle, Cusanus, Leibniz and Kant and appears under the 
guise of classical ontology. This tradition, however, has lived somewhat of a 
reclusive existence in relation to the question of historicity due to the fact that 
it never explicitly sought to answer what historicity is; for good reasons since 
the question first explicitly emerged around the time of the enlightenment. New 
trends in thinking have, however, revitalized these theories. The distinction 
between human versus natural history has increasingly proven problematic. 
Thinkers such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2009: 201) have pointed out that the 
very notion of the Anthropocene seems to undermine the distinction since 
mankind’s historical mode of being is, in a fateful way, brought to bear on 
nature itself and therefore cannot be neatly separated from it. 
Therefore, it seems a legitimate question whether there is such a 
phenomenon as “objective” or “ontological” historicity, i.e. a phenomenon of 
historicity which does not have its locus in human existence. The purpose of 
this article is to conduct a preliminary study into the question of historicity as 
an ontological one in order to gain both a clearer conceptual understanding of 
what the notion entails as well as an understanding of the phenomenon of 
historicity. The ambition is, simply put, to analyse in what sense something can be 
said to be historical. For this purpose, I will utilize classical ontology – as long as 
possible, for it too has its limits with regard to the question of historicity that 
it, for good reasons, could not explicitly seek to answer – as a counterpart to 




3 An extremely widespread assumption, but cf. for example (Heidegger 2006 §74, Dilthey 
1999: 81). 
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The Conception of the Historical in Classical Ontology 
The first ontological determination of history stems from Aristotle, more 
precisely, from the Poetics in a comparison between the fields of history and 
poetry as empirical disciplines. In this short but telling passage, Aristotle 
remarks that history differs from poetry in: “(…) that the one describes the 
thing that has been, and the other a kind of thing that might be. Hence poetry 
is something more philosophic and of graver import than history, since its 
statements are of the nature rather of universals, whereas those of history are 
singulars” (Poet. 1451b). These definitions contain two ontological 
specifications of the historical: 1) that, which is historical, is a something, an event, 
an object or, to use a term from classical ontology, a res, a thing. 2) This thing is 
particular, which in Aristotelian ontology entails that it cannot be the object of 
cognition, since only universals, the forms, can be cognized by reason. This is the 
reason why many philosophers have rejected the possibility of constructing a 
“philosophical science of history”, because, according to Kant: “Die historische 
Erkenntnis ist cognition ex datis, die rationale aber cognition ex principiis” (Kant 
1998: A836). As a category, the historical contains the individually given, not 
universals or general principles, and, as the scholastic dictum goes, the 
“individuum est ineffabile” (Ginzburg 1999: 90). 
The historical as such therefore stems from the contingent, ontological 
reality. This determination is supported by the etymological origins of the word 
“history”, itself a deviation of the Greek word “historia”, which: “(…) betegner 
den viden, man har opnået ved selvsyn, eller som man har erkyndiget sig om 
gennem øjenvidner, altså har fået fortalt” (Hass 2003: 223).4 The historical 
cannot, precisely because it is particular and contingent, be the object of 
cognition but solely the object of experience. The historical is the experientially 
ascertainable and factual and therefore falls inside the realm of the empirical. In 
Leibniz’ terminology, historic facts are vérités de fait rather than vérités de raison. 
But the historical and the empirical are not equivalent in so far as the 
former cannot be identified with the immediately present phenomena, 
according to Aristotle’s definition. The historical is, on the other hand, the 
 
4 Roughly translated: ”(…) designates the knowledge, that one has acquired by experience, or 
that one has obtained through eye witnesses, i.e. has been told.” 
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already-past, bygone or absent phenomena – that which has been but is no 
more. Therefore, in nuce, “the historical” refers to the particular and contingent 
res that has been but is no more while still being given as a datum.5 
 
The Aporia of Historicity 
What is this historical thing, which is both given while somehow still pertaining 
to the past? And what is given through it?  The notion of the datum, the given, 
is by no means a simple concept and cannot be exhaustively unfolded in this 
context. Prior to the critical philosophy of Kant, the term had a certain air of 
that which has already been bestowed, that which is already there regardless of 
any human involvement or tampering – the same meaning at play in the English 
idiom “that’s a given”, i.e. something which is naturally and self-evidently the 
case. After the turn to critical philosophy, however, the given rather comes to 
mean that which presents itself and makes its presence known, especially evident in 
the phenomenological notion of the phenomena (cf e.g. Heidegger 2006: §7), but 
furthermore comes to designate the particular way in which the given is given (cf. 
Marion 2002), how and to whom it presents itself. This is a discussion of great 
import. What we are here discussing, however, is the ontological question – it 
concerns the historical objects as objects, as a certain res – that is not to say that 
the phenomenological givenness of the historical object is irrelevant, but it is 
secondary to the primordial sense of the given, which I am here concerned with. 
The historical is, according to the determinations of the historical above, 
ontologically given; it is a thing of a certain kind, but a thing which 
simultaneously fundamentally relates to the past. Is this, however, not a 
contradiction in terms? Conventional logic would state that the thing either is 
or is not: if it is of the past then it no longer is, if it still is then it is no longer of the past. 
Both properties cannot obtain at the same time. The historical object, however, 
invites us to think both aspects of the object at the same time: that it is while 
simultaneously being of the past. This paradox or aporia lies at the heart of the 
matter regarding the question of objective historicity.  
 
 
5 A view that is quite reminiscent of the every-day conception of the historical that Heidegger 
unfolds in Sein und Zeit (2006: §72). 
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The Museal Object 
The phenomenon of ontological historicity is perhaps easiest to illustrate 
through an example, and one that is quite often evoked by philosophers is the 
museal object: in what sense are the objects of museums historical? In itself, as an object, 
the object of the museum simply is and is neither more nor less than its 
immediate appearance. On reflection, however, this cannot be the case; if it 
were, there would be no difference between the museal object and any ordinary 
object besides the arbitrary choice to make the former an object of history and 
the latter not. Hegel formulates the problem of the museal object as follows: 
Sie sind nun das, was sie für uns sind, - vom Baume gebrochene schöne Früchte, ein 
freundliches Schicksal reichte sie uns dar, wie ein Mädchen jene Früchte präsentiert; 
es gibt nicht das wirkliche Leben ihres Daseins, nicht den Baum, der sie trug, nicht die 
Erde und die Elemente, die ihre Substanz, noch das Klima, das ihre Bestimmtheit 
ausmachte, oder den Wechsel der Jahreszeiten, die den Prozess ihres Werden 
beherrschten. – So gibt das Schicksal uns mit den Werken jener Kunst nicht ihre Welt, 
nicht den Frühling und Sommer des sittlichen Lebens, worin sie blühten und reiften, 
sondern allein die eingehüllte Erinnerung dieser Wirklichkeit (Hegel 1988: 490-491). 
On the one hand, the museal object is nothing more than what it 
immediately is, something present, on the other hand, something additional 
clings to it, the ”eingehüllte Erinnerung” of a reality that no longer is but still 
haunts the object. Hegel’s notion is steeped in the aforementioned subjective 
notion of historicity; the objects of historic import are what they are “für uns”, 
for us – but Hegel simultaneously evokes the notion of “Wirklichkeit” and it is 
this latter part of the equation, which is of interest in this context. 
With the mention of “Wirklichkeit” or reality, we find ourselves in the 
realm of classical ontology. According to Hegel, the historical res is bound to an 
already bygone realitas and is therefore split between two different modes of 
being, being not only given as an immediate and present object, but also as a 
“messenger” or a trace of a bygone era. Yet the historicity of the museal object 
cannot – as per Aristotelian ontology (Aris. Metaph. 1032a) – be reduced to 
either being produced or producing, being conditioned or conditioning, since 
the historicity of the object does not rely upon the fact that one can, by an 
external reflection, follow the links in the causal relations that constitute the 
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object. The essence of the museal object is that this absence or reminiscence of 
something past is given through the presence of the object. 
To put it differently: in the museal object there is an absence that is 
constitutive of its essence, and this absence is positively cognized. It constitutes 
an original context that the object seems torn out of, which reveals that a “was” 
clings to this “is”. The question that Hegel invites us to reflect upon in the 
above-mentioned quotation, is whether this giveness of an absence is thinkable 
without an external spectator which induces this reflection into the matter. To 
presume this, however, would be to turn things upside down: the object of the 
museum is not historical because it takes part in a museal context; it takes part 
in a museal context because it is historical.6 The fact that the object is relevant 
and meaningful as a token of a bygone era presupposes that we do not construct 
its entire being, but that we reconstruct an intrinsic past of the object. With a 
Proustian phrase, one could say that the historical object is like a container, 
which is more than its contents (Proust 2013: 229). 
I have chosen the museal object because it is paradigmatic to the question 
of historicity, though this, by no means, means that it is sui generis. In the 
phenomena of ruins, one finds a similar structure; in works of art as well. Even 
phenomena such as withered leaves seem to display this dynamic in so far as 
they carry an implicit reference to a reality, which has been, but is no more. 
Biological phenomena seem especially to display this dynamic, not just in 
relation to the already bygone but also to what is to come: the seed is, in itself, 
a sign or symbol of what is to come, without this being reducible to a question 
of teleology or causality. 
According to Aristotle, a substance is the quintessence of an object’s 
positive qualities, its “what-ness” or, according to the categories, the different 
ways in which the object can be. The historical res, however, is, according to the 
analysis, not defined by its current properties, but by what it already has been. 
To put it differently, a certain negativity pertains to the historical object; a rift, 
 
6 It might be objected that modern museums are littered with all sorts of reconstructions of 
historic phenomena and that these receive their historic relevance namely through a museal 
context. These simulacra, however, have a “parasitic” existence, so to speak; as simulations, 
they carry an implicit reference to the “real” phenomena that they emulate; I suggest that it is 
through this emulation that they receive their historical character, not by taking place in a 
museal context. 
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an abyss (in German: “Abgrund”) or a remnant that in part constitutes the 
givenness of the object. What defines the historical object is both an element 
of “bygoneness” or absence as well as a “presentness” and presence. This 
negativity, however, does not fade into obscurity but is positively cognized as 
an essential property of the object. 
 
Objective Historicity? 
In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger reflects on the historicity of the museal object, but 
arrives at the conclusion that the ontological problem of historicity is founded 
in an existential, i.e. human problematic (Heidegger 2006: §74):  
Primär geschichtlich – behaupten wir – ist das Dasein. Sekundär geschichtlich aber das 
innerweltliche begegnende, nicht nur das zuhandene Zeug im weitesten Sinne, sondern 
auch die Umweltnatur als ’geschichtlicher Boden’ (ibid: §73). 
Heidegger then goes on to say: 
Zeug und Werk, Bücher zum Beispiel haben ihre ‚Schicksale’, Bauwerke und 
Institutionen haben ihre Geschichte. Aber auch die Natur ist geschichtlich. Zwar 
gerade nicht, sofern wir von ‚Naturgeschichte’ sprechen; wohl dagegen als Landschaft, 
Ansiedlungs-, Ausbeutungsgebiet, als Schlachtfeld und Kultstätte (ibid: §75). 
Only in a derivative fashion can objects be said to be historical because 
what defines historicity is exactly “In-der-Welt-sein”. This entails that only 
Dasein and what Dasein engages with, i.e. cultural artefacts and nature 
“spoiled” by human involvement, can be characterized as historical. 
Is this historicity, i.e. the interplay between what is bygone and what is 
present in the historical objects, an expression of an immanent ontological 
structure, or is it a consequence of an external reflection, which imbues the 
objects with a historical character? Or, in case one admits that the objects are 
historical in themselves, does the historical character stem from the fact that 
they have been in contact with humans, or, to put it differently, that they are an 
expression of “spiritualized matter”? 
None of the answers seem entirely satisfactory. On the one hand, the 
absence that characterizes the historical object seems to be conditioned by, as 
Hegel says, the ground, the elements and the life that the objects were once a 
part of and as such can only be said to be historical, in so far as they took part 
of a now bygone era and culture. On the other hand, the relevance of the museal 
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object is not founded in the fact that one “extorts” a history from it that is 
fundamentally foreign to the object, but that the object, in itself, seems to elicit 
or provoke a reflection on an inherent absence or negativity. 
Perhaps the problem needs to be approached in a different manner. 
Perhaps we need to address how this “mechanism” of historicity “takes place”, 
provided it can be characterized as such. According to the analysis, one of the 
most striking characteristics is that the serialism, that is commonly highlighted 
as an essential property of historicity, seems to be sublated or rather moved to 
a different sphere. Roughly put, the efforts of historicism to put forth a general 
history of the world relies on the presupposition that the historic chain of 
events is ruled by a causality, which can be reconstructed by an analysis of “wie 
es eigentlich gewesen”, as Ranke says. In other words, that there is a seriality in 
the history of the world that every historical phenomenon partakes in. Exactly 
this historical continuum seems sublated in objective historical phenomena, in 
casu the museal object, because the seriality is concentrated in a single point that 
seems to contain a certain co-existence between the absent and the present. 
One could, however, object that this interpretation seems to dilute our 
notion of historicity. Traditionally, philosophers have distinguished between 
the appearance of an object and its essence, or, as Hegel puts it, that “Sein ist 
Schein”7 (Hegel 1999: 9). Therefore, it might seem that the differentia specifica 
between the notion of objects from classical ontology and the notion of 
historicity developed in this context might vanish. Admittedly, both the 
ontological as well as the historical objects seem to display a structure, wherein 
something “ideal” manifests itself in something concrete. On an “ontic” level, 
however, there is a world of difference; what characterizes the historical object 
is actualized being. In other words, the historicity of the historical object consists 
in a modality of being, wherein the potentiality of an object’s different ways of 
being has already been established in a specific process. This process seems, in 
a certain way, to be embedded in and essential to the object: the objects are what 
they have been. An excess or surplus product therefore clings to the historical 
object which makes it more than its immediate appearance. This excess, 
 
7 It must be mentioned, however, that Hegel’s conception of this principle is more dialectical 
than aporetic but getting into the nitty gritty of the Hegelian dialectic would bring this paper 
too far off-topic. 
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however, is constituted by the object’s already actualized being without the 
object being solely reducible to this. 
The distinction between temporality and historicity is still unclear, 
however. Objects can have a past – or a certain fate, as both Hegel and 
Heidegger put it – without having a history, but wherein is the difference 
between a temporal and historical process? If ontological historicity is 
constituted by an interplay between presentism and historicity, the historical 
object has a certain a-topical character, in so far as it is “at home” in different 
contexts, so to speak. One of the most striking features of the museal object is 
that the already-actualized past is an intrinsic property of the object, but 
simultaneously, this original context sets the object apart from the future that 
has yet to be actualized, to which the object “doesn’t belong”; where the object 
will be “just” the “eingehüllte Erinnerung” of a long-lost past. 
I suggest the following: the yet-to-be actualized future is an intrinsic 
property of the historical object, constituted by the object’s ties to an original 
context, just as the already actualized past is a feature of the present object. In 
other words, the being of the historical object entails a perspectival aspect that 
the temporal event does not. The temporal event is “constrained” and 
determined by its place in the causal chain of events. Temporal seriality, in other 
words, seems to constitute the temporal event, while the historical object seems 
to be characterized by a certain a-topical property. 
I do not wish to exaggerate or push this argument excessively; at least, this 
a-topical feature needs to be properly interpreted. Several philosophers have 
stressed the so-called Geschehenscharakter of history, the certain way in which it 
occurs. Events have unfolded, things have turned out a certain way and cannot be 
changed. Irreversibility, in other words, seems an essential feature of historicity. 
It is on the basis of this irreversibility that a work of art, for example, can seem 
hopelessly out-dated, another work can be timely, while a third can appear to 
be ahead of its time. Is this not evidence that the historical object is completely 
embedded in a certain context and therefore not a-topical? This is, however, 
too literal an interpretation. The historical object is a-topical because the 
intrinsic context does not expire; it “haunts” the object even when the context 
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itself no longer is. We might be ignorant of what the context is, but this is an 
empirical rather than ontological question.  
The thesis of the a-topical nature of historicity is less idiosyncratic than it 
might appear at first glance. Reinhart Koselleck, for example, has shown that 
the connection between the historical and the bygone as such is – barring 
Aristotle and others – a relatively new tendency, which emerged at the time 
when history was first consolidated as a discipline at the universities. Koselleck 
cites Novalis, who lived before this consolidation, 8  for the view that an 
overview of extensive chains of historic events would enable one to notice: 
“(…) die geheime Verkettung des Ehemaligen und Künftigen, und lernt die Geschichte aus 
Hoffnung und Erinnerung zusammensetzen” (Koselleck 2010: 352-353). Koselleck 
goes on to say: 
’Geschichte’ hatte damals noch nicht, wie später im Zeigen ihrer wissenschaftlichen 
Aufbereitung, vorzüglich die Vergangenheit gemeint, sondern sie zielte auf jene 
geheime Verknüpfung von Ehemaligem und Künftigem, deren Zusammenhang nur 
zu erkennen ist, wenn man gelernt hat, die Geschichte aus den beiden Seinsweisen der 
Erinnerung und der Hoffnung zusammenzufügen (ibid: 353). 
Walter Benjamin emphasizes a similar point, when he, in the theses on the 
philosophy of history, writes:  
Aber kein Tatbestand ist als Ursache eben darum bereits ein historischer (…) Der 
Historiker, der davon ausgeht, hört auf, sich die Abfolge von Begebenheiten durch die 
Finger laufen zu lassen wie einen Rosenkranz. (…) Er begründet so einen Begriff der 
Gegenwart als der ’Jetztzeit’, in welcher Splitter der messianischen eingesprengt sind 
(Benjamin 1974: Anhang A).  
Furthermore, both philosophers emphasize a certain notion of time and 
history, which contrasts the “empty”, homogenous time with the so-called 
“proper” or “fulfilled” time (ibid: XIV & Koselleck 2010: 356, even though the 
latter uses a somewhat different terminology). 
 
Kairos and Chronos 
The notion of proper, fulfilled time derives from Christian thought, to be more 
precise, the letters of Saint Paul, while the notion of empty time derives from 
the natural and historical sciences. Though I do not wish to engage in biblical 
 
8 Although, admittedly, not long before. 
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exegesis, both Koselleck’s and Benjamin’s use of the concept of fulfilled time 
(in ancient Greek: kairos) has a somewhat different ring to it than Paul’s. Paul 
primarily utilizes the concept while describing, for example, the coming of 
Christ or the point in a human being’s life when the possibility of a radical shift 
in its existence is present (cf. Gal. 4,4 & Eph. 5,4). This particular conception 
of time is also referred to as the “critical” or “opportune” moment, which is 
contrasted by the concept of chronos, i.e. what we normally associate with time: 
the passing of time, the shifting of the seasons etc. By utilizing the term kairos 
instead of chronos, Paul is essentially invoking a notion of qualitatively differentiated 
time. The coming of Christ is not only the fulfilment of the law, i.e. the 
covenant between the Jews and God, which, from that point in time, must be 
considered a thing of the past, but is simultaneously the harbinger of what is to 
come, i.e. salvation from sin and temporal existence. Kairos is therefore 
constituted by salvation from the past as well as the messianic message of what 
is to come, concentrated in the current moment in time. 
This conception of time is a stark contrast to what Benjamin and 
Koselleck refer to as the “homogenous time”, which, on the surface, seems to 
share certain similarities with the concept of kairos. Koyré explicates this 
relation when he distinguishes between the antique notion of time and the 
modern world’s, between “the world of more-or-less” and “the universe of 
precision” (Koyré 1998: 131). Even though the church fathers distinguished 
between kairos and chronos, the latter was influenced by the experience of time 
that characterized the ancient life world, namely the experience that life was 
attuned to and determined by the passing of days, seasons and years – as the 
author of the Ecclesiastes puts it: 
There is a time for everything,  
and a season for every activity under the heavens: 
a time to be born and a time to die, 
a time to plant and a time to uproot,  
a time to kill and a time to heal, 
a time to tear down and a time to build (…) 
(3,1-8). 
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The lifeworld of ancient times had an intrinsic “rhythm”, and every 
moment in life a part in this rhythm. In the transition from the world of more-
and-less to the universe of precision, i.e. from approximately the start of the 
scientific revolution to Galilei, the concept of time grows ever more 
independent of the immediate lifeworld because of the need for reliable 
methods of measuring time. Time becomes “mathematized” and through this 
process a different notion of time emerges, wherein every point or moment in 
time becomes homogenous, abstract, and fit into a causal process like pearls on 
a string. The scientific revolution, therefore, paves the way for a formalized and 
quantitative notion of time. 
The opposition is, therefore, between homogenous time and time 
construed as kairos, where Benjamin’s and Koselleck’s animosity is directed at 
the former rather than time understood as chronos. To reduce the historical to 
a single moment in the empty, homogenous time would de facto equate to 
reducing the historical to a temporal atom, whose only significance would be 
its interplay with other temporal atoms. It is precisely for this reason that a 
notion of time as homogenous and quantitative fails to grasp the significance 
of objective historicity. If the analysis of the museal object stands to reason, 
then the historical object cannot be reduced to a mere temporal atom. On the 
contrary, the object more closely resembles a monad than an atom, to utilize 
Leibniz’ terminology. The historical object contains and expresses a certain world 
from a specific perspective. 
Given that historicity is a subcategory of and derives from temporality, as 
Heidegger explicitly states, there must be a certain overlap between temporality 
and historicity. If we, for the moment being, assume a very minimal and non-
exhaustive definition of temporality, that takes seriality to be a crucial part of it, 
then historicity must also contain an element of seriality. The seriality has not 
disappeared but has rather been sublated as an immanent or intrinsic structure 
in the historical object. In this sense, historicity more closely resembles the 
notion of time as kairos, wherein past, present and future is concentrated in a 
single moment in time, while temporality, on the other hand, is marked by the 
unfolding of qualitatively homogenous time. In his work on Saint Paul, 
Agamben cites the Corpus Hippocraticum for the following definition of kairos 
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and chronos, which elegantly summarizes the characterization: ”chronos is that 
in which there is kairos, and kairos is that in which there is little chronos” 
(Agamben 2005: 68). 
In the Hippocratic theory, the concept of kairos has its own technical 
meaning, which confirms the above. Here the concept appears under the guise 
of the medical crisis, which is the term for the (critical) moment in the disease 
process, wherein the doctor has exhausted all potential cures or medical 
procedures, and the outcome of the disease process and the fate of the patient 
are uncertain: the patient will either succumb or go into remission. The crisis 
refers to the moment which all time or no time at all hinges upon. That is the 
reason why the crisis contains “little chronos”, for everything is concentrated 
in the same moment – the “critical” or “fateful” moment that comprises time, 
in so far as everything has led up to it and all that is to come hinges upon it. 
 
Complicatio & Explicatio 
To sum up: if we abstract the properties of the historicity of the museal object 
to a more general thesis, the following traits seem to be central. That, which 
can be determined as historical, possesses “self-sufficiency” or is “self-
contained” in the sense that its historicity is not founded in being merely a link 
in a chain of events. The a-topical nature stems from the already actualized 
being embedded in the historical object; an implicit reference to a bygone 
context. What is bygone, what is present, and what is to come is, somehow, 
present at hand in the historical object. 
Above, I mentioned that the historical objects – museal object, works of 
art etc. – as singularities exhibit a monadic quality. I do not wish to propagate 
as far-reaching a thesis as Leibniz’ that historical objects as monads contain and 
express the entire universe, but rather the more minimal thesis that they are 
“containers”9 of actualized being. This actualized being refers not only to the 
chain of events on which the object depends. If that were the case, the object 
wouldn’t be able to exhibit a paradigmatic quality; it wouldn’t be representative 
of a certain time and life world. Yet that is exactly what the museal object is: 
 
9 This is, of course, a spatial metaphor and therefore not entirely fitting; one cannot, so to speak, 
open the lid of the historical object and out pops the historical context. The history of the object 
is instead given through its presence, as previously stated. 
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representative. In itself, a stone axe from the Stone Age, for example, can be a 
rather banal object, being “merely” a shaped stone but as an expression of a 
certain epoch it carries an altogether different significance. It expresses the 
limits and possibilities of an era, the lifeworld of the people who crafted and 
utilized the axe etc. The historical object is time materialized: the quintessence of 
a world expressed from a certain perspective. The historical, therefore, has a 
dual mode of being, being neither reducible to the purely bygone nor the 
present, the purely perspectival or general, but at the same time being either-or 
and more-than both. By what ontological “mechanism” can both traits co-exist 
in the historical objects? 
Though I can only hint at it in this context, Nicolaus Cusanus operates 
with an insightful distinction in his ontology. According to Cusanus, the 
fundamental ontological property of all being is the so-called similitudo, roughly 
translated, a similarity. Similarities are relations and therefore require at least two 
comparable elements. For a platonic philosopher, this is pre-eminently valid of 
the relation between principium and principiata, between essences or ideas and 
phenomena. What is particularly interesting in this context, is the logical 
principle that Cusanus develops to explain the similitudo. Given that the same 
principium is the foundation of several manifestations, then the specific 
principiata must, in a certain sense, be contained within the principium and vice 
versa; the principiata must be differentiations of that which is immanently 
contained in the principium. In the terminology of Cusanus, this logical 
distinction is called the complicatio, the “enfolded”, and the explicatio, the 
“unfolded”, which, for a Christian neo-platonic philosopher, must characterize 
the relation between God and world to an eminent degree. 
It is this logical principle that I wish to focus on in this context. In the 
above, I have alluded to this, which can now be stated more unequivocally: 
historical being is actualized being and time in a contracted form, which implies that what 
once unfolded in real time exists in the historical object as an enfolded structure. 
Maintaining this principle, the distinction between historicity and temporality 
does not collapse; for the differentia specifica is that historicity implies enfolded 
time, while temporality entails unfolded time. The historicity of objects is 
 118 
founded in the actualized being, embedded in the objects, which “breaks forth” 
from their appearance. 
Classical ontology emphasizes the particularity and givenness of the 
historical to which must be added the property of universality qua enfolded 
world. What this amounts to, is that the historical is constituted by the interplay between 
the perspectival and universal. Both aspects co-exist in the historical in virtue of a 
complicatio and explicatio, for what it entails to be enfolded in this sense, is, that 
what formerly constituted an external whole is contracted in such a way that it 
becomes singular. Like the fulfilled time, which contracted future, past and 
present in the same event, the enfolded structure in the historical object seems 
to contract a number of aspects in the same singularity, which transcends before 
and after and is more than the sum of its parts; this aspect, however, is only given 
negatively, as reminiscences and remnants that cling to the object. It is this 
ambiguity that constitutes the aporia of the historical object. 
 
Conclusion 
The historical object is in turn both simple and complex, as both Leibniz and 
Cusanus would posit – simple, because the object is “nothing more” than its 
appearance or immediate being; complex, because the reminiscences, the 
”eingehüllte Erinnerung”, of a lost reality emerges from this immediate being. 
In a passage in the play Die natürliche Tochter, Goethe makes his character 
Eugenie say the very striking, famous lines: 
 Der Schein, was ist er, dem das Wesen fehlt? 
 Das Wesen, wär’ es, wenn es nicht erschiene? 
 (cited from Øhrgaard 1999: 134) 
Bracketing the context of the quotation, what Goethe here seems to imply 
is that, while essences and the appearances of these manifest themselves 
through each other, the aspects never fully reconcile. The relation is one of 
unrest and non-coincidence rather than harmonious co-existence. This seems a 
fitting metaphor for the historical object whose aspects remain autonomous as 
the presence of an absence and the absence of a presence – different 
expressions of a complex monadic nature. Perhaps this aporia, however, owes 
to the primary examples investigated in this context, i.e. the museal object and 
 119 
the work of art; as expressions of “sedimented” human subjectivity, their nature 
is such that they are not reducible to a mere lifeless object. Perhaps, then, it is 
fitting, considering the topic of the investigation at hand, that the paper should 
end on an aporetic note – the question of objective historicity remains an open 
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